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[Crim. No. 6786. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1961.] 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ALBERT 
ERNEST LOVE, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1] Criminal Law-Judgment--Procedure for Determining Penalty. 
-On retrial by jury on the issue of penalty following an 
adjudication that defendant was guilty of first degree murder, 
it was proper procedure to permit the prosecutor to open and 
close the penalty trial and argument to the jury. 
[2] Id.-Judgment--E1fect.-On retrial by jury on the issue of 
penalty following an adjudication that defendant was guilty 
of first degree murder and was sane at the time of commission 
of the offense, defendant cannot reopen the question of his 
sanity at the time of commission of the offense, the adjudica-
tion as to the issue of insanity having been affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 270 et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 8] Criminal Law, § 1011.1; [2] 
Criminal Law, § 1018; [5] Criminal Law, § 97; [6] Jury, § 103(7); 
[7] Criminal Law, § 1390; [9] Homicide,§ 88; [10] Homicide, 
§ 236; [11] Homicide, § 242; Criminal Law, § 934; [12] Homicide, 
§ 273; [13] Homicide, § 242; [14, 15] Criminal Law, § 934; [16, 20] 
Criminal Law, § 617; [17, 23] Criminal Law, §§ 622, 623; [18] 
Criminal Law, § 618; [19] Criminal Law, §§ 619, 620; [21, 22] 
Criminal Law, § 632; [24] Evidence, § 12; [25] Criminal Law, 
§ 622; [26] Criminal Law, § 1099; [27, 29] Criminal Law, § 1404 
(19); [28] Criminal Law, § 1407(15). 
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[8] ld. - Judgment - Procedure for Determining Penalty.-On a 
penalty trial following an adjudication that defendant was 
guilty of first degree murder, the court did not err in dis-
missing defendant's subpoena for the Governor and a prison 
warden, where defendant voluntarily dismissed the subpoena 
for the warden, and where the Governor was subpoenaed to 
elicit his views on capital punishment, and the penalties for 
first degree murder have been fixed by the Legislature (Pen. 
Code, § 190). The wisdom or deterrent effect of those penalties 
are for the Legislature to determine and are not justiciable 
issues; evidence as to these matters is inadmissible. 
[4] Id.-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Juries 
in capital cases cannot become legislatures ad hoc, and trials 
on the issue of penalty cannot be converted into legislative 
hearings. 
(5) Id.-Venue-Change of Venue-Discretion.-An application 
for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse 
of discretion is shown. 
[6) Jury-Challenges-Questions as to Death Penalty.-The court 
in a murder case did not err in excusing prospective jurors 
conscientiously opposed to capital punishment. 
[7] Oriminal Law-Appeal-Harmless Error-Jury-Ohallenges.-
Where both sides, during selection of the jury, "passed" the 
jury as presently constituted, and thereafter both the prose-
cutor and defendant continued to exercise peremptory chal-
lenges, with no objection to their doing so, defendant could 
not have been prejudiced thereby. 
r8] ld.-Judgment-Procedure for Determining Penalty.-Where 
photographs of the victim in an uxoricide case were not ex-
ceptionally gruesome and tended to prove how the shooting 
occurred and to corroborate evidence that defendant inten-
tionally held the gun close to his wife's body to avoid injuring 
others, these facts were relevant to punishment as well as to 
guilt. 
[9] Homicide-Evidence-Punishment.-Evidence of the minimum, 
average and maximum terms actually being served by persons 
convicted of first degree murder is admissible. 
[10] ld.-Instructions-Punishment.-The jury in a murder case 
may be instructed on the minimum time that must be served 
before a prisoner will be eligible for parole, and that the actual 
period of parole depends on a number of factors, including his 
criminal record and his behavior in prison. 
[11] ld.-Punishment: Oriminal Law - Verdict - Modification.-
Although the jury in a jury trial has exclusive power in the 
first instance to select the penalty for first degree murder as 
between death and life imprisonment, this does not affect the 
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power of the trial court, in disposing of defendant's motion for 
new trial, to reduce the punishment from death to life im-
prisonment. Based on its own independent view of the evi-
dence, the trial court is not only empowered to reduce the 
degree or class of the offense, but is also empowered to reduce I 
the penalty imposed. ' 
[12] Id.-Appeal-Modi1l.cation of Judgment.-The Supreme Court 
cannot substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact as 
to choice of punishment for first degree murder even where 
it may doubt the appropriateness of the death penalty. 
[1S] Id.-Punishment.-Only the trial court has power to reduce 
the punishment originally selected by the trier of fact for 
first degree murder. 
[14] Criminal Law-Vernict-Modification.-The trial court in a 
murder case not only has the power to reduce the penalty, 
but the duty to review the evidence and determine whether in 
its judgment the weight of the evidence supports the jury's 
verdict. In performing that duty the trial court must judge 
the credibility of witnesses, determine the probative force of 
testimony and weigh the evidence. 
[15] Id.-Verdict-Modification.-On defendant's motion to reduce 
the penalty from death to life imprisonment in a murder case, 
the trial court erred in giving weight to the jury verdict 
that had been set aside on the grounds of newly discovered 
evidence and to the jury verdict that had been set aside be-
cause of the admission of prejudicial evidence. Although the 
court eould properly consider the jury verdict in the present 
case, it could not rely on that verdict alone and thus shift its 
own responsibility to the jury; it had an independent responsi-
bility to give defendant and the People the benefit of its own 
judgment as to whether or not the death penalty was proper. 
[16] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Counsel's summation to 
the jury must be based solely on those matters of fact of 
which evidence has already been introduced or of which no 
evidence need be introduced because of their notoriety as 
judicially noticed facts. 
[17] Id.-Argument of Counsel-IDustrations-Matters of Com-
mon Knowledge.-Counsel may during argument state matters 
not in evidence that are common knowledge or are illustrations 
drawn from common experience, history or literature. 
[18] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Reference to Extraneous Matters. 
-Counsel may not, under the guise of argument, assert as 
facts matters not in evidence or excluded because inadmissible. 
[19] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Inferences: Opinions as to Guilt. 
-Counsel may not use evidence offered for a special purpose, 
[16] See Cal.Jur.2d, Trial, § 430 et seq.; Am.Jur., Trial, § 463. 
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such as cl'edibility or state of mind, to argue inferences for 
which the evidence is inadmissible, and. he may not argue his 
own belief of guilt based on evidence not produced in court. 
[20] Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope.-Counsel may not use 
arguments calculated to mislead the jury or that appeal pri-
. maril;r to passion or prejudice. 
[21] Id. - Argument of Counsel- Comment on Punishment.-
Statements of prosecutors that it is necessary swiftly and 
severely to punish the guilty are usually considered within the 
bounds of proper argument. 
[22] Id. - Argument of Connsel- Penalty Phase of Case.-The 
prosecutor may not in his argument in a murder case state as 
a fact that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent 
than imprisonment, since the Legislature has left to the abso-
lute discretion of the jury the fixing of punishment for first 
degree murder. There is thus no legislative finding, and it is 
not a matter of common knowledge, that capital punishment 
is or is not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment; since 
evidence on this question is inadmissible, argument thereon by 
prosecution or defense could serve no nseful purpose, is apt 
to be misleading, and is therefore improper (Overruling 
People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 766-768 [306 P.2d 463], inso-
far as it is inconsistent with this conclusion.) 
[28a, 2Sb] Id.-Argument of Counsel-IDustrations-Matters of 
Oommon Knowledge.-The prosecutor in a murder case could 
not properly assert during argument without any evidence in 
the record that many criminals use empty guns and that they 
do so because of fear of the death penalty, relating alleged 
conversations between police and criminals that were not in 
evidence, since these facts were not a matter of common knowl-
edge. The prosecutor, under guise of illustration, improperly 
attempted to furnish specific facts to support his argument. 
[24] Evidence--Judicial Notice.-Since judicial notice by a jury is 
more limited than judicial notice by the trial court, faets are 
deemed within the common knowledge of the jury only if they 
are matters of common human experience or well known laws 
of natural science. 
[25] Oriminal Law - Argument of Counsel- IDustrations.-Al-
though counsel may illustrate a general truth, the illustration 
must not degent'rate into an improper assertion of specific 
facts bearing on the case in hand. 
[26] Id.-Appeal-Objections-Argument of Counsel.-A defend-
ant who did not object to improper statements of the prose-
cutor during argument to the jury could not ordinarily raise 
the issue of their propriety on appeal unless they were of such 
charactt'r tllat the error could not have been cured by prompt 
admonition and instructions of the trial court. This rule 
) 
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applies to defendants who have refused counsel as well as to 
those represented by counsel. 
[27] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Counsel.-The 
Supreme Court in a murder case could not consider the prose-
cutor's improper statements of fact in the abstract, although 
defendant did not object to them at the trial, where tlleY 
were part and parcel of his erroneous argument with respect. 
to the deterrent effect of the death penalty. 
{28] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Argument of Counsel.-Even 
if the argument of the prosecutor in a murder case with re-
spect to the deterrent effect of the death penalty were other-
wise proper, an admonition to disregard his improper state-
ments of fact would not have cured the error as to that argu-
ment, where he firmly believed that the death penalty is a 
more effective deterrent than imprisonment and that the facts 
he advanced in support of his belief were true, and where 
he would not have been willing to recant his statements had 
defendant objected, and the trial court could not have labelled 
them as erroneous without itself giving inadmissible hearsay 
and opinion evidence in support of defendant. At most the 
trial court could admonish the jury to disregard the prose-
cutor's statements; it could not erase them from the jurors' 
minds or explain why they should not be considered without 
further magnifying their impact. 
[29] Id. - Appeal- Reversible Error - Argument of Counsel.-
Where the prosecutor's argument in a murder ease that the 
death penalty was essential to deter murder was not a minor 
part of his appeal to the jury, but was one of three main points 
around which he built his argument and he supported it with 
statements of fact he should have known he was not entitled 
to make, the error was prejudicial, and a judgment imposing 
the death penalty should be reversed, it appearing that it was 
reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant 
would have been reached in the absence of the error. 
APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239, 
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Butte 
County and from an order denying a new trial. J. F. Good, 
Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing 
the death penalty reversed and cause remanded for retrial and 
redetermination of question of penalty only and for pro-
nouncement of new sentence and jUdgment. 
Carl B. Shapiro, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Defendant and Appellant. 
) 
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Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, and Raymond M. Momboisse, Deputy At-
torney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
. TRAYNOR, J.-For the third time a jury has fixed de-
fendant '8 penalty at death for the murder of his wife. He 
was first tried in 1958. The jury found him guilty but could 
not agree on the penalty. A second jury fixed the penalty at 
death; but the trial court granted a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence, and we affirmed. (PeopZe v. 
Love, 51 Ca1.2d 751 [336 P.2d 169].) Defendant was again 
tried in 1959 and found guilty of murder in the first degree; 
again the jury fixed the penalty at death. We affirmed the 
judgment as to the adjudication that defendant is guilty of 
murder of the first degree and was sane at the time of the 
commission of the offense. We reversed the judgment as to 
the imposition of the death penalty because of the admission 
of evidence tending to inflame and prejudice the jury. (People 
v. Love, 53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705].) 
Upon retrial of the issue of penalty, defendant discharged 
his attorneys and conducted his own defense. The court cau-
tioned him not to waive counsel; but defendant insisted on 
defending himself. The jury again fixed the penalty at death. 
This appeal from the judgment entered on the jury verdict is 
automatic. (Pen. Code, § 1239, subd. (b).) 
[1] Defendant contends that the trial court denied him 
due process by permitting the prosecutor to open and close 
the penalty trial and the argument to the jury. This procedure 
was expressly approved in PMple v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404, 
407 [340 P.2d 626]. That case governs here, even though 
a new jury was selected to consider the penalty. (People v. 
Gonzalez, ante, pp. 317, 319 [14 Cal.Rptr. 639, 363 P.2d 
871].) 
[2] Defendant cannot reopen the question of his sanity 
at the time of the commission of the offense, for the judgment 
on the issue of insanity was affirmed in People v. Love, supra, 
53 Ca1.2d 843, 858. 
[3] The court did not err in dismissing defendant's 
subpoena for Governor Brown and Warden Duffy. Defendant 
voluntarily dismissed the subpoena for Warden Duffy. He 
had subpoenaed Govettior Brown to elieit his views on capital 
punishment. The penalties for fir!';t degree murder have been 
fixed by the Legislature. (Pen. Code, § 190.) The wisdom 
or deterrent effect of those penalties are for the Legislature 
') 
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to determine and are therefore not justiciable issues. Hence: 
evidence as to these matters is inadmissible. [4] Juries in 
capital cases cannot become legislatures ad hoc, and trials on 
the issue of penalty cannot be converted into legislative hear-
ings. 
[ 5 ] The court did not err in denying a change of venue. 
An application for change of venue is addressed to the sound 
discretion of the trial court. (People v. BurweU, 44 Ca1.2d 
16, 30 [279 P.2d 744].) There has been no showing of abuse 
of discretion. [ 6 ] The court did not err in excusing pros-
pective jurors conscientiously opposed to capital punishment. 
(People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 575-576 [305 P.2d 1].) 
[ 7 ] During the selection of the jury both sides "passed" 
the jury as presently constituted. Thereafter, both the prose-
cutor and the defendant continued to exercise peremptory 
challenges. There was no objection to their doing so, and 
defendant could not have been prejudiced thereby. 
[8] Defendant objects to the introduction of two colored 
photographs of the victim. In People v. Love, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 
at pages 852-853, we stated" [t]he photographs in the present 
ease were not exceptionally gruesome. . .. The photographs 
tend to prove how the shooting occurred and corroborate 
evidence that defendant intentionally held the gun close to 
his wife's body to avoid injuring others." These facts are 
relevant to punishment as well as to guilt. (People v. Jones, 
52 Ca1.2d 636, 647 [343 P.2d 577].) 
Defendant contends that the court erroneously admitted 
evidence and erroneously instructed the jury on the average 
time between conviction and parole of prisoners serving a 
life sentence for first degree murder. He insists that parole 
of prisoners differs from case to case and that statistics on 
this subject are misleading. 
[9] Evidence of the minimum, average and maximum 
terms actually being served by persons convicted of first 
degree murder is admissible. (People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 
884-885 [346 P.2d 22].) Moreover, defendant elicited all 
relevant testimony on the factors that influence parole and 
that ,,"ould be considered by the Adult Authority in his case be-
fore granting him a parole. [10] The trial court instructed 
the jury on the minimum period of imprisonment before de-
fendant would be eligible for parole. It also instructed the 
jury that the actual period of parole depends on a number 
of factors including his criminal record and his behavior in 
prison. The court then reviewed the evidence on the mean 
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and median times between conviction and parole served by 
prisoners sentenced to life imprisolllnent for first degree 
murder. In People v. Reese, 47 Cal.2d 112, 116-117 [301 P.2d 
582], we held that a jury may be instructed on the minimum 
time that must be served before a prisoner will be eligible for 
parole; the instructions in the present case were more favor-
able to defendant. 
Defendant contends that the trial court did not give proper 
c·onside.ration to his motion to reduce the penalty from death 
to life imprisonment. 
After the jurors returned their verdict the court granted 
defendant a continuance to prepare his motion for a new trial. 
He then obtained counsel who presented the motion. They 
urged the court to reduce the penalty to life imprisonment 
on the ground that the evidence did not justify a sentence 
of death. The court ruled that it did not have the power to 
reduce the penalty and could grant a new trial only for errors 
of law. 
Defendant's counsel, invoking People v. Moore, 53 Ca1.2d 
451,454 [348 P.2d 584], insisted that the court had the power 
to reduce the penalty, but the court disagreed, stating: "Well, 
it's [the Moore case) a little different, apparently, apparently 
the remanding of the particular case was not as unlimited, 
not as limited as the relflanding [of) this case." The follow-
ing exchange between court and counsel ensued: 
"MR. SHAPIRO: No, because the same issue is at stake, 
isn't it, the only issue." 
"THE COURT: Well, the conditions of the exercise of any 
discretion are predicated upon either an error of law, or a 
right on the part of the Court to recommend to the jury the 
sentence to be imposed, being vested by statute and I don't 
find that anywhere in the Penal Code under present procedure 
affecting penalty trials in murder. 
"MR. SHAPIRO: At the time of remanding this case, after 
the remand order remanding it in the Moore case, this court, 
the court in the Moore case was exactly in the same position 
as the Court is today, I believe . 
.. THE COURT: It is rather hard to rationalize, but--
"MR. SHAPIRO: Beg pardon T 
"THE COURT: The decision would be there, however, in view 
of the fact that three juries have exercised their conscientious 
judgment in this regard, I can't say that the death penalty 
was improper in this case. The motion for a new trial will be 
denied!' 
) 
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[11] In People v. Moore, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 451, 454, we 
declared: 
C C Although the jury in a jury trial has the exclusive power 
in the first instance to select the penalty for first degree I 
murder as between death and life imprisonment [citations], , 
this does not affect the power of a trial court, in disposing 
of a defendant's motion for a new trial, to reduce the punish-
ment 'from' death to life imprisonment. Based upon its own 
independent view of the evidence, the trial court is not only 
empowered to reduce the degree or class of the offense [cita-
tions], but is also empowered to reduce the penalty imposed." 
(Italics added.) 
The power of the trial court to review the evidence and 
to reduce the penalty fixed by the jury is therefore settled. 
[ 12 ] It is also settled that " '. . . This court cannot sub-
stitute its judgment as to choice of punishment [citation] 
even where we may doubt the appropriateness of the death 
penalty [citations].' ... [13] Only the trial court has the 
power to reduce the punishment originally selected by the trier 
of fact .... " (People v. Bittger, 54 Ca1.2d 720, 734 [355 
P.2d645].) 
[14] Thus, the trial court has not only the power to 
reduce the penalty but the duty to review the evidence and 
to determine whether in' its judgment the weight of the 
evidence supports the jury's verdict. (People v. Borchers, 
50 Ca1.2d 321, 328, 330 [325 P.2d 97].) In performing 
that duty the trial court must " '. . . judge the credibility 
of the witnesses, determine the probative force of the testi-
mony and weigh the evidence ... .''' (People v. 8hera11, 49 
Ca1.2d 101, 109 [315 P.2d 5].) 
It is clear from the record in this case that the 
trial court not only erred as to the scope of its power to 
reduce the penalty but also failed to give defendant's motion 
the consideration required by People v. Moore, and People v. 
8heran. During most of the discussion of the motion the court 
was of the opinion that it did not have the power to reduce 
dIe penalty. At the time of the ruling on the motion, the court 
still doubted that it had such power and indicated that even if 
it had it would not exercise that power because three juries 
had fixed the penalty at death. 
[ 15 ] The trial COUl't erred in giving weight to the jury 
vf'rdict that had been set aside on the grounds of ne,,,ly 
discovered evidence and to the jury vel'dict that had been 
set aside because of the admission of prejudicial evidencf'. 
Nov. 1961] PEOPLE V. LoVE 729 
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Although the court could properly consider the verdict of 
the jury in the present case, it could not rely on that verdict 
alone and thus shift its own responsibility to the jury. It 
had an independent responsibility to give defendant and the 
People the benefit of its own judgment as to whether or not 
the death penalty was proper. 
If the only error was the failure of the trial court 
properly to consider defendant's motion for a new trial, it 
would be appropriate to vacate the judgment and order 
denying the motion for new trial with directions to the trial 
court to reconsider the motion and to enter the appropriate 
judgment or order. (See People v. Moore, supra, 53 Ca1.2d 
451, 452.) Since it appears, however, that the prosecutor 
committed prejudicial misconduct in arguing the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty to the jury, the judgment and 
the order denying the motion for new trial must be reversed. 1 
During closing arguments the prosecutor urged the jury 
to fix the penalty at death because such penalty would serve 
as a deterrent to others. The prosecutor also stated: "It is a 
known fact that callous, hardened criminals when they commit 
burglaries, robberies, breakins, rarely carry loads in their 
pistols. . .. [W]hen men are asked after these crimes are 
committed, ... 'you don't keep any loads in your gun when 
you were arrested. Why is that T' Do you know that these 
people say? Members of the jury, they say they know that 
the law says that if they kill someone while they are in that 
robbery, or that burglary, that they will get the death penalty, 
and therefore thinking and reflecting on that, even while they 
commit their crimes, they unload their guns and as insurance 
against not getting the death penalty. . . . In other words if 
there were no death penalty, if jurors did not exercise their 
sound discretion in a proper case such as this and inflict it 
'There is no merit in defendant's contentions that the prosecutor also 
committed prejudieial miseonduet by reserving psyehiatrie testimony 
for rebuttal that should ha ... e been offered, if at all, in the case in ehief 
and by stating during the 'Voir dire and in Ms argument that he repre· 
sented the People of the State of California. 
The psyehiatric testimony was offered to rebut testimony by a defense 
witness that defendant was incapable of premeditation. The issue of 
defendant's eapacity to premeditate ,,'as not part of the prosecutor's 
ease in cllief in the trial on the penalty. It was proper rebuttal, and 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. 
Pen. Code, ~ 1093, subd. 4; People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2d 737, 753·754 
[312 P.2d 665].) Moreover, defenilllnt did not object to its admission. 
The prosecutor's statements that he represents the People of Cali· 
fornia were not improper. (People v. Wrin, 50 Ca1.2d 888, 895 [826 
P.2d 457].) 
) 
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and have the courage to inflict it, it would be better for a 
burglar or murderer or someone committing a crime to take 
a chance and kill someone .... [T]hey would know then that 
they could gamble ten to twelve years against shooting some-
one to escape and silencing the witness, killing the policeman, 
killing the clerk and getting away, but they know their life is, 
paltry as they are, it keeps them in line, and gives them the 
fear in their hearts that they are not going to murder innocent 
people, not because they don't want to, but for plain good 
business that they might gamble ten to twelve years life im-
prisonment on a parole to shoot someone to kill someone, but 
they won't gamble their own life." 
[16] Counsel's summation to the jury II must be based 
solely upon those matters of fact of which evidence has already 
been introduced or of which no evidence need ever be intro-
duced because of their notoriety as judicially noticed facts." 
(6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1806, p. 269; accord 
People v. Evans, 39 Cal2d 242, 251 [246 P.2d 636].) [1'1] He 
may state matters not in evidence that are common knowledge, 
or are illustrations drawn from common experience, history, 
or literature. (People v. Gingell, 211 Cal 532, 541-542 [296 
P. 70] ; People v. Molina, 126 Cal. 505, 508 [59 P. 34] ; People 
v. Scarborough, 171 Cal.App.2d 186, 190 [340 P.2d 76]; 
People v. Travis, 129 CalApp.2d 29, 37-39 f276 P.2d 193] ; 
Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 D.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 
150; 1 Thompson, Trials, 814-817, 831.) [18] He may not, 
however, under the guise of argument, assert as facts matters 
not in evidence or excluded because inadmissible. (People v. 
Kirkes, 39 Ca1.2d 719, 724 [249 P.2d 1]; People v. Evans, 
supra, 39 Cal.2d 242, 251; People v. Oarr, 163 Ca1.App.2d 568, 
577 [329 P.2d 746] ; People v. Whitehead, 148 Cal.App.2d 701, 
705-706 [307 P.2d 442] ; People v. Vienne, 142 Cal.App.2d 172, 
173-174 [297 P.2d 1027] ; People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 
675 [245 P.2d 633] ; see 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) 
§ 1807, p. 261.) [19] He may not use evidence offered for 
a special purpose, such as credibility or state of mind, to argue 
inferences for which the evidence is inadmissible (People v. 
Purvis, ante, pp. 93, 99 [13 Cal.Rptr. 801, 362 P.2d 
713] ; People v. Adams, 182 Ca1.App.2d 27, 38 [5 Ca1.Rptr. 
795] ; People v. Talle, sup,"a, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 675; see 6 
Wigmore, Eyidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1807, p. 272), and he 
may not argue his own belief of guilt baspd upon evidence 
not produced in court. (People v. Kirkes, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 
719, 724; People v. Edgar, 34 Cal.App. 459, 468 [167 P. 8911 ; 
\ 
) 
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see 6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1806, p. 259; Stout, 
AppeUate Review 0/ Orimi'1!4l Oonvictions on Appeal, 43 Cal. 
L.Rev. 381, 427.) [20] Moreover, counsel may not use 
arguments calculated to mislead the jury (People v. Purvis, 
52 Cat2d 811, 886 [346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Oaetano, 29 Cal. 
2d 616, 619-620 [177 P.2d 1] ; People v. Johnson, 178 Cal.App. 
2d 360, 372 [3 Cal.Rptr. 28] ; AfJett v. Milwaukee cf; Suburban 
Transport 00., 11 Wis.2d 604 [106 N.W.2d 274, 280]; see 
Michael and Adler, Trial 0/ an Issue 0/ Fact, 34 Colum.L.Rev. 
1224, 1483-1484) or that appeal primarily to passion or 
prejudice. (People v. Wein, 50 Ca1.2d 383, 397 [326 P.2d 
457] ; People v. Simon, 80 Cal.App. 675, 677-679 [252 P. 758] ; 
see Levin and Levy, Persuading the Jury,105 U.Pa.L.Rev.139, 
143; 54 Colum.L.Rev. 946, 949; 36 Colum.L.Rev. 931, 935.) 
[21] Prosecutors have often stated that it is necessary 
swiftly and severely to punish the guilty, and such statements 
have usually been considered within the bounds of proper 
argument. (People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 766 [306 P.2d 
463]; People v. Wilson, 61 Cal.App. 611, 628 [215 P. 565] ; 
State v. Rhoden (Mo.) 243 S.W.2d 75, 77; Johnson v. 
State, 141 Tex. Crim. Rep. 43 [147 S.W.2d 811, 814]; 
Smith v. State, 74 Ga.App. 777 [41 S.E.2d 541, 551] ; People 
V. Wood, 318 Ill. 388 [149 N.E. 273, 274] ; see Levin and Levy, 
Persuading the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 162-163; 54 Colum. 
L.Rev. 946, 958.) [22] In the present case, however, the' 
prosecutor went beyond merely urging severe punishment. 
He stated as a fact the vigorously disputed proposition that 
capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than im-
prisonment. The Legislature has left to the absolute discre-
tion of the jury the fixing of the punishment for first degree 
murder. (People V. Green, 47 Ca1.2d 209, 232 [302 P.2d 307] ; 
People V. Friend, supra, 767-768.) There is thus no legislative 
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that 
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than 
imprisonment. Since evidence on this question is inadmissible, 
argument thereon by prosecution or defense could serve no 
useful purpose, is apt to be misleading, and is therefore im-
proper. It is true that in Pe.ople v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 
766-768 [306 P.2d 463], we stated that counsel could advance 
"arguments as to which penalty will better serve the objec-
tives of punishment" and listed deterrence of crime as one 
of those objectives. To the extent that People v. Friend is 
inconsistent with our conclusion herein it is overruled. 
That decision, however, was binding on the trial court 
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at the time this case was tried, and it would have been an idle 
act for defendant to object in the trial court to the prose-
cutor's argument that capital punishment is a more effective 
deterrent than imprisonment. He is therefore not precluded 
from raising the question for the first time on appeal. (People 
v. Kitchens, 46 Ca1.2d 260, 262-263 [294 P.2d 17], and cases 
cited.) 
[23a] The prosecutor also asserted without any evidence 
in the record that many criminals use empty guns and that 
they do so because of fear of the death penalty, and he related 
alleged conversations between police and criminals that were 
not in evidence. These facts also are not a matter of common 
knowledge. (Commonwealth v. Sykes, 353 Pa. 392 [45 A.2d 
43, 45] ; see Levin and Levy, Per81Ulding the Jury, 105 U.Pa. 
L.Rev. 139, 162-163.) [24] Since judicial notice by a jury 
is more limited than judicial notice by the trial court (Mc-
Cormick, Evidence, p. 691), facts are deemed within the 
common knowledge of the jury only if they are matters of 
common human experience or well known laws of natural 
science. (See Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra, 353 Pa. 392 
[45 A.2d 43, 45]; McCormick, Evidence p. 691; Levin and 
Levy, Persuading the Jury, 105 U.Pa.L.Rev. 139, 157-167.) 
Thus in Commonwealth v. Sykes, supra, the Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania held that statistics allegedly indicating that 
the number of murders has decreased in states that have 
abolished capital punishment were not a matter of common 
knowledge and could not be used by defense counsel in his 
closing argument. 
[25] Although counsel may illustrate a general truth, 
the illustration must not degenerate into an improper asser-
tion of specific facts bearing on the case in hand. (See 
6 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed. 1940) § 1807, p. 266.) [23b] In 
the present case under guise of illustration the prosecutor im-
properly attempted to furnish specific facts to support his 
argument. 
[26] Such statements have never been sanctioned; how-
ever, since defendant did not object to them, he ordinarily 
could not raise the issue of their propriety on appeal unless 
they were of such character that the error could not have been 
cured by prompt admonition and instructions of the trial 
court. (People v. Hampton, 47 Ca1.2d 239, 240 [302 P.2d 
300] ; People v. Kirkes, supra, 39 Ca1.2d 719, 725-727; People 
v. Sampsell, 34 Ca1.2d 757, 764 [214 P.2d 813]; People v. 
Johnson, 153 Cal.App.2d 564, 570-571 [314 P.2d 751].) This 
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rule applies to defendants who have refused counsel as well 
as to those represented by counsel. (People v. Brajevich, 174 
Cal.App.2d 438, 447 [344 P.2d 815].) [27] We cannot 
consider the prosecutor's improper statements of fact in the 
abstract, however, for they were part and parcel of his errone-
ous argument with respect to the deterrent effect of the death 
penalty.' [28] Moreover, even if that argument were other-
wise proper, an admonition to disregard his improper state-
ments of fact would not have cured the error. This is not 
a case in which a misstatement of law or of the evidence in 
the record could have been corrected by the court or the 
prosecutor himself had it been called to their attention. (See 
People v. Sampsell, 34 Ca1.2d 757, 763-765 [214 P.2d 813].) 
The prosecutor firmly believed that the death penalty is a 
more effective deterrent than imprisonment and that the 
facts that he advanced in support of his belief were true. 
Surely he would not have been willing to recant his statements 
had defendant objected, and the trial court could not have 
labelled them as erroneous without itself giving inadmissible 
hearsay and opinion evidence in support of defendant. At 
most it could admonish the jury to disregard the prosecutor's 
statements; it could not erase them from the jurors' minds or 
explain why they should not be considered without further 
magnifying their impact. 
[29] The prosecutor's argument that the death penalty 
was essential to deter murder was not a minor part of his 
appeal to the jury for that penalty. It was one of the three 
main points around which he built his argument, and he sup-
ported it with statements of fact he surely should have 
known he was not entitled to make. In People v. ltinden, 
52 Ca1.2d 1, 27 [338 P.2d 397], we pointed out that error 
tending to affect the jury's attitude in fixing the penalty 
"implicitly invites reversal in every case. Only under extraor-
dinary circumstances can the constitutional provision [art. 
VI, § 4%] save the verdict." We find no such circumstances 
in this case, and we are convinced that it is "reasonably prob-
able that a result more favorable" to defendant "would have 
been reached in the absence of the error" and that accordingly 
the error is prejudicial. (People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 
836 [299 P.2d 243].) 
The judgment imposing the death penalty and the order 
denyinlr a new trial on the question of penalty are reversed, 
Rlld tIle cause is remanded for retrial and redetermination 
or the question of penalty only and for the pronouncement of 
) 
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a new sentence and judgment in accordance with such deter-
mination and the applicable law. 
Gibson, C. J., Peters, J., White, J., and Dooling, J., con-
curred. 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. 
First: I do not believe that the district attorney's argu-
ment to the jury constituted prejudicial misconduct. 
In my opinion, it is a matter of common knowledge that the 
death penalty is a deterrent, because: 
(a) Christians and Jews from the beginning of recorded 
history have recognized that the death penalty is a deterrent 
to murder. 
This is demonstrated by the fact that, according to the 
account contained in the Old Testament (see New American 
Catholic Edition, The Holy Bible (1950», the Lord spoke 
to Moses and said: "He that striketh and killeth a man: dying 
let him die." (Leviticus 25, verse 17.) "If any man strike 
with iron, and he die that was struck: he shall be guilty of 
murder, and he himself shall die. If he throw a stone, and 
he that is struck die: he shall be punished in the same manner. 
If he that is struck with wood die: he shall be revenged by 
the blood of him that struck him. . . . These things shall be 
perpetual, and for an ordinance in all your dwellings. . . . 
You shall not take money of him that is guilty of blood: but 
he shall die forthwith." (Numbers 35, verses 16-31.) 
(b) In the early history of the western states of the United 
States of America, including California, the death penalty 
was imposed by the early settlers to stop the rustling of cattle. 
It is a matter of common knowledge that in the early days of 
this state the apprehension and hanging of cattle rustlers 
reduced, and almost stopped, the theft of cattle. 
(c) In the early history of San Francisco, law enforcement 
broke down and chaotic conditions prevailed. A group of 
citizens, known as the Vigilantes, undertook to restore orller. 
To do this, they apprehended criminals and after trial 
promptly executed the guilty parties. Order was restored, and 
the civil authorities assumed control again. Clearly fear of 
the death penalty was the basic reason for the restoration of 
M~ I 
(d) Any prosecuting attorney or criminal defense attorney i 
or any trial judge who has sat for a substantial period in a i 
department of the superior eourt devoted to the trial of felony. 
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cases knows that many felons are careful to refrain from arm-
ing themselves with a deadly weapon because they do not want 
to take the chance of killing anyone and suffering death as 
a penalty. 
A "few recent examples of the accuracy of this view are to 
be found in the following cases involving persons arrested by 
officers of the Los Angeles Police Department;· 
(i) Margaret Elizabeth Daly, of San Pedro, was arrested 
August 28, 1961, for assaulting Pete Gibbons with a knife. 
She stated to investigating officers: "Y eh, I cut him and I 
should have done a better job. I would have killed him but I 
didn't want to go to the gas chamber." 
(ti) Robert D. Thomas, alias Robert Hall, an ex-convict 
from Kentucky; Melvin Eugene Young, alias Gene Wilson, 
a petty criminal from Iowa and Illinois; and Shirley R. Coffee, 
alias Elizabeth Salquist, of California, were arrested April 
25, 1961, for robbery. They had used toy pistols to force their 
victims into rear rooms, where the victims were bound. When 
questioned by the investigating officers as to the reason for 
using toy guns instead of genuine guns, all three agreed that 
real guns were too dangerous, as if someone were killed in the 
commission of the robberies, they could all receive the death 
penalty. 
(iii) Louis Joseph Turck, alias Luigi Furchiano, alias 
Joseph Farino, alias Glenn Hooper, alias Joe Moreno, an 
ex-convict with a felony record dating from 1941, was arrested 
May 20, 1961, for robbery. He had used guns in prior rob-
beries in other states but simulated a gun in the robbery here. 
He told investigating officers that he was aware of the Cali-
fornia death penalty although he had been in this state for 
only one month, and said, when asked why he had only 
simulated a gun, II I knew that if I used a real gun and that 
if I shot someone in a robbery, I migltt get the death penalty 
and go to the gas chamber." 
(iv) Ramon Jesse Velarde was arrested September 26, 
1960, while attempting to rob a supermarket. At that time, 
armed with a loaded .38 caliber revolver, he was holding 
several employees of the market as hostages. He subsequently 
escaped from jail and was apprehended at the Mexican border. 
While being returned to Los Angeles for prosecution, he made 
the following statement to the transporting officers:. "I think I 
·The eases eited are taken from the reeords on file in the Los Angeles 
I Police Department. 
736 PEOPLE tI. LoVE [56 C.2d 
might have escaped at the market if I had shot one or more 
of them. I probably would hatle done it if it wasn't for tM 
gas ch4mber. I'll only do 7 or 10 years for this. I don't want 
to die no matter what happens, you want to live another day." 
(v) Orelius Mathew Stewart, an ex-convict, with a long 
felony record, was arrested March 3, 1960, for attempted bank 
robbery. He was subsequently convicted and sentenced to the 
state prison. While discussing the matter with his probation 
officer, he stated: "The officer who arrested me was by himself, 
and if I had wanted, I could have blasted him. I thought about 
it at the time, but I changed my mind when I thought of the 
gas chamber." 
(vi) Paul Anthony Brusseau, with a criminal record in 
six other states, was arrested February 6, 1960, for robbery. 
He readily admitted five holdups of candy stores in Los 
Angeles. In this series of robberies he had only simulated 
a gun. When questioned by investigators as to the reason for 
his simulating a gun rather than using a real one, he replied 
that he did not want to get the gas chamber. 
(vii) Salvador A. Estrada, a 19-year-old youth with a 
four-year criminal record, was arrested February 2,1960, just 
after he had stolen an automobile from a parking lot by 
wiring around the ignition switch. As he was being booked 
at the station, he stated to the arresting officers: "I want 
to ask you one question, do you think they will repeal the 
capital punishment law. If they do, we can kill aU you cop. 
and judges without worrying about it." 
(viii) Jack Colevris, a habitual criminal with a record 
dating back to 1945, committed an armed robbery at a super-
market on April 25, 1960, about a week after escaping from 
San Quentin Prison. Shortly thereafter he was stopped by 
a motorcycle officer. Colevris, who had twice been sentenced 
to the state prison for armed robbery, knew that if brought 
to trial, he would again he sent to prison for a long term. The 
loaded revolver was on the seat of the automobile beside him, 
and he could easily have shot and killed the arresting officer. 
By his own statements to interrogating officers, however, he 
was deterred from this action because he preferred a pOBB·ible 
life sentence to death in the gas chamber. 
(iJt) Edward Joseph Lapienski, who had a criminal record 
dating back to 1948, was arrested in December 1959 for a 
hoidup committed with a toy automatic type pisiol. When 
questioned by investigators as to why he had threatened his 
victim with death and had not provided himself with. the 
( 
(~ 
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means of carrying out the threat, he stated, II I know that if 
I had a real gun ond killed someone, I would get Ihe gas 
chamber." 
(x) George Hewlitt Dixon, an ex-convict with a long felony 
record in the East, was arrested for robbery and kidnaping 
committed on November 27, 1959. Using a screwdriver in his 
jacket pocket to simulate a gun, he had held up and kidnaped 
the attendant of a service station, later releasing him un-
harmed. When questioned about his using a screwdriver to 
simulate a gun, this man, a hardened criminal with many 
felony arrests and at least two known escapes from custody, 
indicated his fear and respect for the California death penalty 
and stated, "I did 'I1ot want to get the gas. II 
(xi) Eugene Freeland Fitzgerald, alias Edward Finley, 
an ex-convict with a felony record dating back to 1951, was 
arrested February 2, 1960, for the robbery of a chain of candy 
stores. He used a toy gun in committing the robberies, and 
when questioned by the investigating officers as to his reasons 
for doing so, he stated: "I know I'm going to the joint and 
probably for life. If I had a real gun and killed someO'l1e, I 
would get the gas. I would rather hatle it this way." 
(xii) Quentin Lawson, an ex-convict on parole, was arrested 
January 24, 1959, for committing two robberies, in which he 
had simulated a gun in his, coat pocket. When questioned on 
his reason for simulating a gun and not using a real one, he 
replied that he did flOt want to kill someo'l1e ond get the death 
penalty. 
(xiii) Theodore Roosevelt Cornell, with many aliases, an 
ex-convict from Michigan with a criminal record of 26 years, 
was arrested December 31, 1958, while attempting to hold up 
the box office of a theater. He had simulated a gun in his coat 
pocket, and when asked by investigating officers why an ex-
convict with everything to lose would not use a real gun, he 
replied, "If I used a real gu'l1 and shot someone, I could lose 
my life." 
(xiv) Robert Ellis Blood, Daniel B. Gridley, and Richard 
R. Hurst were arrested December 3, 1958, for attempted rob-
bery. They were equipped with a roll of cord and a toy pistol. 
When questioned, all of them stated that they used the toy 
pistol because they did flOt want to kt'll aflyone, as they were 
aware that the pe'l1alty for killi'l1g a person in a robbery was 
death in the gas chamber. 
(e) The people of the State of California have, through 
. their Legislature, 011 many occasions considered whether the , 
) 
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death penalty should be abolished in this state-this as recently I 
as the 1961 session of the Legislature-and in each instance 
have come to the conclusion that the death penalty is a de-
terrent and have retained it. Therefore, the judiciary of this 
state is bound to follow the legally expressed will of the . 
sovereign people of the State of California. 
Second: Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's state-
ments. Therefore, he cannot raise the issue of their propriety 
on appeal unless they were of such character that the error 
could not have been cured by prompt admonition and instruc-
tions of the trial court. (People v. Hampton, 47 Ca1.2d 239, 
240 [3] [302 P.2d 300].) In my opinion, any alleged prejudice 
could have been cured by a prompt request for, and the giving 
of, an admonition and instructions by the trial judge. 
'l'hird: In my opinion, the trial judge properly exercised his 
discretion in denying the motion for a new trial on the penalty 
phase. 
Any judge or attorney who has had trial court experience 
knows that a trial judge is not always familiar with all the : 
procedural law at the outset of the trial of a case. This is ' 
particularly true at the present time and is in part due to 
the ever-changing rules of law. This view was recently ex-
pressed by Honorable Evelle J. Younger, of the Los Angeles 
Superior Court, in an address which he delivered before I 
the Lawyers Club. The following report on Judge Young- I 
er's remarks appeared in one of the Los Angeles legal news-
papers: " .... 
"As an example Judge Younger noted the recent changes 
in the rules on admissibility of evidence obtained by illegal 
search and seizure. 'We have just recently run the gamut 
from the common law rule that such evidence was admissible 
in Federal or State courts regardless of how obtained, if of 
probative value, to absolute exclusion.' The latest rule of 
absolute exclusion was handed down this year in the case of 
Dolly Mapp. [Dollree Mapp v. Ohio, 364 U.S. 868 (81 S.Ct. 
111, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081).] 
"The result of these changes is that it becomes increasingly I 
difficult for local peace officers to determine what are, and : 
what are not, allowable procedures in 'coping with mounting I 
criminal activity.' An arrest, he stated, cannot be justified if i 
it shocks the conscience-but whose conscience is the deter- : 
mining factorY 'Not the community's. Not the Police Chief's. t 
. . . Weare talking about the conscience of the Ninth Mem- I 
ber of the United States Supreme Court. And, we are not ': 
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talking about his conscience yesterday; we are talking about 
his tomorrow's conscience.' 
"If judges and legal scholars have difficulty in defining 
due process, one can sympathize with the lonely policeman 
patrolling his beat who is expected to make legally correct 
split-second decisions, he commented. 
" 
"The speaker concluded by reiterating, 'We must zealously 
guard the rights of individuals; but in protecting the indi-
vidual charged with crime we should never lose sight of the 
rights of society.''' (Metropolitan News, Vol. XXXIX, No. 
152 (8/31/61); The Los Angeles Daily Journal, Vol. LXXIV, 
No. 175 (9/1/61).) 
The result is that a trial judge must rely to a large measure 
upon the information furnished him by the attorneys appear-
ing before him. In the present case this was done. After the 
trial judge expressed doubts as to his authority to reweigh 
the evidence following the jury's fixing of the death penalty, 
counsel for defendant pointed out to him that he did have such 
authority. Whereupon the judge accepted the view that he 
had authority on the motion for a new trial to reweigh the 
evidence as to the application of the death penalty. He then 
stated that assuming he had such authority, he would deny the 
motion, as the penalty was properly imposed, and that this 
view was supported by the fact that three juries had imposed 
the death penalty for the crime of which defendant was con-
victed. 
The problem presented is not a mere academic one. The 
people of this state are faced with an extremely important 
situation. 
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying the 
motion for a new trial. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-I concur in the conclusions 
stated by Mr. Justice McComb and in his reasoning. I find 
it necessary, however, to emphasize my differences with the 
majority opinion. 
I can understand with the majority that there is a reason-
ably debatable question as to whether the record affirmatively 
and satisfactorily shows that the trial court performed its 
full duty to independently weigh the evidl'nce as required 
by People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Ca1.2d 321, 328 [1, 2], 330 
[9, 10] [325 P.2d 97] and People v. Moore (1960) 53 Ca1.2d 
451,454 [2] [348 P.2d 584]. However, construing the record 
) 
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favorably to affirmance, as is the duty of a reviewing court, 
I am satisfied with Justice McComb's conclusion that the 
judgment should be affirmed. 
The reversal of a judgment in a case of this character (and 
this is a second reversal in the same case) even when clearly 
required under establislled law, is in itself a serious matter. 
But far transcending the importance of the reversal in adverse 
effect on law enforcement, are certain pronouncements in the 
opinion (hereinafter quoted) which, whether so intended or 
not, constitute an attack on the death penalty. I cannot find 
justification in fact or in law for the majority's criticism of the 
prosecutor's argument to the Jury regarding the death penalty 
or for the pronouncements which constitute an undermining 
attack on that penalty. 
The majority relate that "For the third time a jury has 
fixed defendant's penalty at death for the murder of his 
wife .... [After the first trial] the trial court granted a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, and . 
we affirmed. [Citation.] Defendant was again ... found 
guilty ... ; again the jury fixed the penalty at death. We 
affirmed the jUdgment as to the adjudication that defendant is 
guilty of murder of the first degree and was sane .... We 
reversed [McComb, J., and Schauer, J., dissenting] ... as 
to the imposition of the death penalty because of the admis-
sion of evidence tending to inflame and prejudice the jury. 
(People v. Love [1960] 53 Ca1.2d 843 [350 P.2d 705].)" 
The order of the majority in the above referred to reversal 
is as follows (p. 858 of 53 Ca1.2d): "The judgment is 
reyersed as to the imposition of the death penalty, and the 
cause is remanded for retrial and redetermination of the ques-
tion of penalty only and for the pronouncement of a new 
sentence and judgmcnt in accordance with such determina-
tion and the applicable law." The applicable law includes 
the provision of section 190.1 of the Penal Code, that "Evi-
dence may be presented at the further proceedings on the 
issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the crime, 
of the defendant's background and history, and of any facts 
in aggravation or mitigati.on of the penalty. The determina-
tion of the penalty of life imprisonment or death shall be . 
. . . on the evidence presented . ... " (Italics added.) 
Yet today the majority rule that (ante, p. 729) "Since it 
appears, . . . that the prosecutor committed prejudicial mis-, 
conduct in arguing the deterrent effect of the death penalty 
to the jur~', the judgment ... must be reversed." 
Nov. 1961] PEOPLE 11. LOVE 741 
(56 C.2d 'l2O; 16 Cal.Rptr. 777. 17 Cal.Rptr. till. 366 P.2d 33. IOBJ 
What possible rationality can be found in the provision 
of section 190.1 that "Evidence may be presented . . . on 
the issue of penalty ... and of any facts in aggravation or 
mitigation of the penalty" if evidence and argument cannot 
-be addressed to what is then the sole issue in litigation T What 
can the words "Evidence ... in aggravation or mitigation 
-of tlle penalty" mean if they do not relate to a basis for 
selecting as between the more drastic penalty-the greater 
deterrent-and the mitigated one of imprisonment T 
I agree with the majority that (ante, p. 725) "TIle court 
did not err in dismissing defendant's subpoena for Governor 
Brown and Warden Duffy .... He had subpoenaed Gov-
ernor Brown to elieit his views on capital punishment. The 
penalties for first degree murder have been fixed by the Legis-
lature. (Pen. Code, § 190.) The wisdom or deterrent effect 
of those penalties are for the Legislature to determine and are 
therefore not justiciable issues. [Manifestly the Legislature has 
made the determination.] Hence evidence as to these matters 
is inadmissible." Certainly the above holding is correct. But 
most assuredly no inference can properly be drawn from that 
holding that the Legislature has left any doubt that on its 
findings and in its judgment both the death penalty-for its 
greater deterrent effect, particularly in aggravated cases-and 
so-called life imprisonment-with its lesser effect for miti-
gated cases-are essential for the protection of society in Cali-
fornia. 
But in contrast to the law the majority go on to assert that 
the judgment here must be reversed and remanded for a new 
(fourth) trial on the issue of penalty because: "[The prose-
cutor] stated as a fact the vigorously disputed proposition 
that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than 
imprisonment." Would "vociferously" perhaps be a more 
accurate adverb than "vigorously'" And since, as the ma-
jority already had held, the Legislature has fixed the penalties 
for first degree murder and they" are therefore not justiciable 
issues, " why should the prosecutor not accept the findings of 
the Legislature and the law as to the two alternative penalties, 
exactly as he did, and offer evidence and argument pertinent 
to the jury's performance of duty, as clearly contemplated by 
the Legislature in its enactment of Penal Code sections 190 
and 190.1 f 
The majority continue: "The Legislature has left to the 
absolute discretion of the jury the fixing of the punishment 
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for first degree murder [i.e., without any control by the judge 
of their discretion but, of course, presumably rationally in the 
light of the evidence]. [Citation.] There is thus no legislative 
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that 
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than 
imprisonment." The italicized pronouncement, in my view, 
is obnoxious to fact and law. Unsupported by statute or prior 
decision, it is a blow which appears to be aimed directly 
against rational application, and therefore toward ultimate 
abolition, of the death penalty. If the quoted italicized pro-
nouncement were true-that there is neither legislative find-
ing nor common knowledge "that capital punishment is or is 
not a more effective deterrent than imprisonment" then, of 
course, the death penalty should be abolished. 
Further implementing its tenet the majority opinion con-
tinues: "Since evidence on this question [presumably evi-
dence in aggravation or mitigation of penalty as contemplated 
by Pen. Code, § 190.f] is inadmissible, argument thereon 
by prosecution or defense eould serve no useful purpose, 
is apt to be misleading, and is therefore improper. It is 
true that in People v. Friend [1957] 47 Cal.2d 749, 766, 768 
[306 P.2d 463], we stated that counsel could advance 'argu-
ments as to which penalty will better serve the objectives of 
punishment' and listed deterrence of crime as one of those 
objectives. To the extent that People v. Friend is inconsistent 
with our conclusion herein it is overruled." (Italics added.) 
By the above quoted holdings the majority in effect place 
the prosecutor in a forensic strait jacket as to argument for 
the greater deterrent. Those holdings also effectually emascu-
late the provision of Penal Code section 190.1, for the taking 
of evidence to aid the jury in making an intelligent and 
informed selection as between the alternative, but by no means 
equal, penalties of death or imprisonment. In so doing it 
appears to me that the majority action trenches upon an 
invasion of the legislative province in disregard of the distri-
bution of powers prescribed by California Constitution, article 
III, section 1. (Compare Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. 
(1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 213-221 [11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 359 P.2d 
457]; see also dissenting opinion, pp. 221-224; Civ. Code, 
§ 22.3; Stats. 1961, ch. 1404, p. 3209.) To the same end today's 
majority also disregard the doctrine of stare decisis in over-
ruling (as above quoted) the decisional law which admittedly 
had bound the trial court 8.t the time of trial. 
Although overruling the cited decision the majority rely on • 
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it as a basis for reversal. They say "That decision [Friend 
(1957)], however, was binding on the trial court at the time 
this case was tried, and it would have been an idle act for 
defendant to object in the trial court to the prosecutor's argu-
ment that capital punishment is a more effective deterrent 
than imprisonment. He is therefore not precluded from rais-
ing the question for the first time on appeaL" The trial court 
thus is reversed for following the law as it existed at the time 
of trial-and as it also existed at the time of this court's first 
reversal of the judgment and remand "for retrial and re-
determination of the question of penalty only." 
Actually the correct rules, as had been held by this court 
in the Friend (1957) decision, relative to the selection of 
penalty (as between death and so-called life imprisonment) 
are stated or indicated in the now overruled case. Insofar as 
appears proper to be quoted here, the opinion in that case de-
clares (p. 764 [8] of 47 Cal.2d): "We note ... that the 
trend is toward the more liberal admission of evidence perti-
nent only to the selection of penalty. For example, it has be-
come established practice to advise the jury of the facts con. 
cerning the possibilities of pardon, commutation, parole, etc. 
[Citations.] Obviously, the law pertaining to pardons, com-
mutations and paroles has not the slightest relevancy to the 
issue of guilt; it is pertinent only as a fact which may be con-
sidered in selecting the penalty to be imposed; i.e., it is evi-
dence which may be considered as relevant to the 'aggrava-
tion' or 'mitigation' of punishment in the sense in which those 
terms have been used in relation to the selection of penalty . 
. . . [P.767 [13].] They [the jury] should be told ... that 
beyond prescribing the two alternative penalties the law itself 
provides no standard for their guidance in the selection of the 
punishment; . . . that in deciding the question whether the 
accused should be put to death or sentenced to imprisonment 
for life it is within their discretion alone to determine, each 
for himself, how far he will accord weight to the considera-
tions of the several objectives of punishment, of the deter-
rence of crime, of the protection of society, of the desirability 
of stcrn retribution, or of sympathy or clemency, ... " 
(Italics in last sentence added.) We pointed out also that 
(fn. 8, p. 766) "For some years many courts and writers on 
criminal law and penology have held that the purpose of 
legally adjudicated punishment is not or should not be venge-
ance, but rather deterrence of the offender and other prospec-
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tive offenders from crime, ... " (Italics added.) All of the 
foregoing, the majority today brush aside. 
Regardless of individual preferences among the justices I 
deem it to be the duty of this court to accept the fact that the 
:r.egislature has determined that the death penalty, in the cases 
wherein it is prescribed, is the strongest deterrent against the 
commission of such crimes. The fact that the jury (or the 
trial judge) has a final power of determination as to whether 
the death penalty or life imprisonment shall be imposed in a 
given case is of course not a legislative determination that life 
imprisonment is an equally strong deterrent. It merely shows 
the concern of the Legislature that liability to suffer the 
strongest deterrent be surrounded by the strongest safeguards 
for the accused. Even as the death penalty is the strongest 
deterrent against murder, so is it also the most effective 
protector of the lives of the victims of those who deliberately 
choose the commission of crimes of violence as a profession. 
That the ever present potentiality in California of the death 
penalty, for murder in the commission of armed robbery, 1 
each year saves the lives of scores,2 if not hundreds of victims 
of such crimes, cannot I think, reasonably be doubted by any 
judge who has had substantial experience at the trial court 
level wth the handling of such persons. I know that during 
my own trial court experience, which although not extensive 
in criminal law, included some four to five years (1930-1934) 
in a department of the superior court exclusively engaged in 
handling felony cases, I repeatedly heard from the lips of 
robbers-some amateurs (no prior convictions), some profes-
sionals (with priors)--substantially the same story: "I used a 
toy gun [or a simulated gun or a gun in which the firing pin 
or hammer had been extracted or damaged] because I didn't 
want my neck stretched." (The penalty, at the time referred 
to, was hanging; death by lethal gas was substituted in 1941.) 
II use robbery as the example for discussion because the deterrent 
effect of the death penalty for murder in the commission of (or attempt 
to commit) robbery is particularly well known among law enforcement 
officers who bandle Buch cases at the investigation, arrest, and trial 
eourt levels. The point of my discussion, however, is equally applicable 
to the deterrent effect of the death penalty againat harming kidnap 
victims and against murder committed in the perpetration or attempt 
to perpetrate arson, rape, burglary, mayhem or lascivious acts upon a 
child under the age of 14. (See Pen. Code, ~~ 209, 189, 190, and 288.) 
'According to tlle 1958-1960 Report of the Department of Justice tlle 
number of robberies reported in California in 1959 was 11,548. 
It may be noted also that in the aame year 108,002 burglaries were 
reported in this state. 
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I, of course, recognize that there are persons who in all 
sincerity urge that the death penalty be abolished. They point 
to the cases which reach the courts and say: "See, it has not 
deterred the commission of these crimes." Certainly the 
potentiality of the penalty is not 100 per cent effective as a 
deterrent as to all criminals. But it would be absurd to claim 
. that because it did not deter all it did not deter any. As to 
each victim of each armed robbery whose life is spared because 
that one robber was deterred from killing, I dare say that the 
victim and his loved ones would not quibble over the per-
centage of the deterrent's efficacy. 
There are also persons who entertain a conscientious scruple 
against any taking of human life. When a person who con-
scientiously believes that the state should never take a human 
life is called upon to take part in the operation of a death 
penalty law he, understandably-being conscientious in duty 
as well as in personal conviction-will suffer grievously. 
Whether he shall advocate repeal of the law would be one 
thing; urging forbearance of execution might be another. 
But regardless of whether a person has or has not any official 
connection whatsoever with law enforcement, and whether he 
realizes it or not, the death penalty law is a matter of import-
ance to his safety. Whether any citizen would urge amend-
ment of the law to make its application more swift and sure, 
or would repeal it altogether, or change it otherwise, the de-
cision he makes should be of grave concern to him-and to his 
neighbors. Certainly each person must live with his own 
conscience. It is, however, to be hoped that his decision, 
as to any action affecting the death penalty which is motivated 
by conscience, will be an enlightened decision; that the decision 
he makes will be more than superficially consistent with his 
true objective. To make such a decision requires thinking-
and information. By information, I mean facts, not theories. 
Probably all of us who have thought on the subject-and par-
ticularly those of us who have some responsibility in these 
cases (even as remote as it is at the appellate level)-devoutly 
wish that the death penalty were no longer necessary. But we 
have not yet reached the state which Sir Thomas More en-
visioned. Until a Utopian government has become reality, 
organized society (if it is to exist) must continue on the posit 
of free will and personal responsibility for one 'schoices of 
action (see People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Ca1.2d 716, 724 [336 
P.2d 492]) with sanctions for crimes appropriate to their 
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gravity. A good government owes protection to its law 
abiding citizens. 
Let us consider further this business of armed robbery. 
It is much more profitable, ordinarily, than burglary but it 
entails more risk. Robbery means facing the victim and tak-
ing the property "from his person or immediate presence 
... against his will, accomplished by means of force or 
fear." (Pen. Code, § 211.) The victim (if not blind and 
deaf) is a potential witness. Robbery is "in the first degree" 
if "perpetrated by torture or by a person being armed with 
a dangerous or deadly weapon. . . ." (Pen. Code, § 211a.) 
Other kinds of robbery are of the second degree. Robbery in 
the first degree is punishable "by imprisonment in the state 
prison . . . for not less than five years;" that of the second 
degree, by like imprisonment "for not less than one year." 
(Pen. Code, § 213.) The maximum in both cases is life 
imprisonment. Few, if any, law-respecting people would con-
tend that these sentences, particularly in view of the early 
parole probabilities, are too severe. 
The risk of undergoing such a sentence is just as much a 
calculated risk of the professional robber as is the risk of 
deflation (or competition) a calculated risk of the conventional 
businessman. But the robber can do one thing that will vastly 
decrease the risk of identification and conviction: he can 
eliminate the known witnesses-the victims he robs. To accom-
plish any robbery he must at least make a show of force and 
induce fear; and for that reason he usually carries a gun-
or something that looks like a gun. It cannot be validly dis-
puted that the choice as to which he carries-a gun or what 
looks like a gun-is in case after case controlled solely by his 
respect for the death penalty. If the punishment he risks for 
robbery is to be imprisonment-and only imprisonment, even 
if he eliminates the only witness-it would seem inevitable 
that the incentive to kill would be greatly increased. The 
greater chance of escaping any punishment would, in the 
minds of some at least, outweigh the slighter risk of having 
the term increased. Many a robber who would take the risk 
of a longer term would absolutely shun any plan which sub-
stituted death for imprisonment. 
And now I return to the subject of conscientious scruples 
against the execution of a human being. From what has 
already been said it must be obvious that I understand that 
it would be poignantly desirable (in the faithful performance 
. of their law enforcement duties) for jurors and trial judges. 
) 
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particularly, and also for justices of courts of review, and 
governors or other officers having the power of commutation, 
if the death penalty were abolished. But I comprehend also 
. that it would be tragically undesirable to the families of the 
innocent victims who would die violently as a result. 
Because of what my own eyes have seen and my ears haye 
. heard I cannot doubt the efficacy of the death penalty as a 
savior of the lives of victims of robbers, kidnapers, burglars, 
and criminals of similar dispositions. But if there were doubt 
in my mind I should resolve it in favor of protecting the 
innocent victims of the future rather than sparing the guilty 
killers of the past. 
Inasmuch as today's majority opinion (1) may well be 
construed as at least approaching an invitation to the Legis-
lature to repeal the death penalty; (2) as it declares a 
proposition which, if accepted, would constitute a basis argu-
ably demanding repeal;8 and (3) as it shackles district attor-
neys and trial courts in effective administration of the present 
law as it was enacted, it may well be that the Legislature 
should give attention to the legislation so affected. In that 
connection, in view of today's court action and of the entire 
record of appeals from penalty determinations under Penal 
Code sections 190 and 190.1 (as those sections were, respec-
tively, amended and added by Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, p. 3509, 
and Stats. 1959, ch. 738, p. 2727), the Legislature perhaps 
will wish to give consideration to the possible desirability of 
eliminating the alternative of imprisonment in certain situa-
tions to be designated by the Legislature, and making the 
greater deterrent the sole penalty, to follow as a matter of 
law on final conviction in any such designated situation. It 
would seem that, if such action is contemplated, the Legis-
lature in its study might consider whether the greater deter-
rence of such ccrtainty might reasonably be made applicable 
to those who personally would kill, or direct another to kill, 
"in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, rape, 
robbery, burglary, mayhem, or any act punishable under 
Section 288," or in kidnaping. (See Pen. Code, §§ 189, 209.) 
Finally, I emphasize: each person who officially or unoffi-
cially participates in or advocates enforcement, repeal or 
amendment of the subject law-and who receives the benefits 
of its protection-must live with his own conscience. But I re-
'Why, in<leed, slJoultl it not be repealed if, as the mnjority declare, it 
is no more of a deterrent to murder than is mere imprisonment! 
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spectfully and earnestly urge that he who would consider 
repealing or otherwise defeating operation of this law, thc 
principal purpose of which is to protect the lives of the vic-
tims of crimes of violence, will either make sure that the 
. information on which he acts is sound and convincing or will 
pause to consider what his conscience may tell him as to some 
measure of moral responsibility for the "eliminations" which 
reason suggests may thereby be encouraged. 
McComb, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December 
1, 1961. Schauer, J., and McComb, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. The following opinion!; 
were then rendered: 
SCHAUER, J., and McCOMB, J., Dissenting.-The At-
torney General has filed on behalf of the People of California 
a petition for rehearing in which he presents facts, law, and 
argument supporting his request that this court reconsider 
its majority decision filed November 2, 1961. The petition 
has been denied but the arguments of the Attorney General 
remain fundamentally unanswered. 
Such arguments are founded on facts which have been gen- I 
erally recognized in organized society since time immemorial 
and on the law of this state as it had existed in all material 
respects, until the majority's unprecedented pronouncement, 
from at least the time that the Penal Code was adopted in 
1872. Only the fiat of the majority denies validity to the 
clearly expressed intention (and implied finding) of the I 
Legislature (Pen. Code, §§ 190 and 190.1) that evidence and 
argument in aggravation of the penalty mean evidence and 
argument for the penalty of death, while evidence and argu-
ment in mitigation of penalty seek so-called life imprisonment 
in contrast to death. How can it be said that a governor can 
comm1de a death sentence to imprisonment unless the latter 
be a mitigated, i.e., a lesser punishment' A mitigated punish-
ment is, of course, a lesser deterrent than an aggravated 
punishment. If this be not true, we should abandon a society 
based on the premise that man is a free agent; a fortiori we 
should scrap the entire system of modern penology because 
it is based on the concept that man is a free moral agent, a 
reasoning being responsive to sanctions and benefits. And if ! 
the aggravated punishment is not a greater deterrent than the ! 
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lesser then it would be simply cruel and unnecessary; hence 
it would violate section 6 of article I of our Constitution and 
be void. 
We observe that as a matter of simple logic the majority's 
decision must inevitably tend to encourage murders in the 
commission of crimes of violence, hence to increase for every 
citizen,· . and .particularly for law enforcement officers, the 
hazard of death by violence; further, we note that the opinion 
fails to respect the necessarily implied finding of the Legis-
lature as to the deterrent effect of the death penalty, im-
plicit in the express provisions for the trial of the penalty 
issue in capital cases (see Pen. Code, §§ 190 and 190.1) which 
were enacted following and implementing our decision in 
Peop~e v. Friend (1957) 47 Ca1.2d 749, 764 [8], 766 (fn. 8), 
767 [13] [306 P.2d 463]. Instead of respecting, the majority 
opinion effectually emasculates, the penalty selection pro-
visions of section 190.1 and overrules the decision which the 
Legislature had thereby implemented and which concededly 
had been the law of this state when the case was tried. 
Because the petition for rehearing (aigned by Attorney 
General Stanley Mosk, by Assistant Attorney General Doris 
H. Maier, and by Deputy Attorney General Raymond M. 
Momboisse) so cogently, albeit respectfully, presents the case 
for the P(Jlple, and because of the grave import of this de-
cision to peace officers, to the law-abiding public and to the 
Legislature, we deem it proper to, and we do, incorporatp. 
herein the major portion of the petition, as f"llows: 
"This Court has held that it was error for the district 
attorney to argue that the death penalty is a more effective 
deterrent than life imprisonment as there is no legislative 
finding, and it is not a matter of common knowledge, that 
capital punishment is or is not a more effective deterrent than 
imprisonment. Further: this Court found that it was error 
for the prosecutor to assert, without any evidence in the 
record, that many criminals use empty guns and that they 
do so because of the fear of the death penalty. 
" 
"Certainly it was the intent of the Legislature in enacting 
section 190.1 of the Penal Code to codify the law as expressed 
in People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749 [306 P.2d 463], that at 
the penalty phase the jury should be fully advised of the 
consequences of the penalties which might be imposed. 
"This Court in People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, at 765-
768 [306 P.2d 463], held that to aid the jury to act in-
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to which punishment, under all the circumstances shown, 
will be more appropriate and desirable in the cause of justice. 
To that end, appeals to reason in the exercise of the jury's 
discretion were held to be proper, as were appeals for clemency 
or for stern retribution. 
"This Court went on to outline the great responsibility 
placed upon members of the jury and the difficultness of that 
verdict. Naturally in the conscientious discharge of their 
duty, jurors are eager to have, and have a right to have given 
to them, all the guidance the law can offer. Among thosc 
things which this Court at that time felt were essential for 
an intelligent determination by the jury were arguments as 
to which penalty will better serve the objectives of punish-
ment. Among those objectives this Court recognized deter-
rents [sic] to the offender, and other prospective offenders. 
"P-eople v. Friend was decided on January 25, 1957. In 
that same year the Legislature added section 190.1 to the 
Penal Code, in which it was provided that there should be a 
separate trial to pass on the question of penalty when one of 
the alternative penalties was death. At that trial 'Evidence 
may be presented . • . of the circumstances surrounding the 
crime, of the defendant's background and history, and of 
any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.' 
"It is presumed that the Legislature at the time it enacted 
this statute knew of the decision of this Court in the case of 
People v. Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749 [306 P.2d 463] (KtLsior v. 
Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603, 618 [7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657]). 
"Indeed it could be said, as was beld by this Court in 
People v. Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36, 47 [338 P.2d 416], that it is 
apparent the Legislature had in mind the law and presumably 
knew of the existing domestic decisional law in this regard 
and intended not to change it. Ratber, by utilizing the judi-
cially construed words 'aggravation or mitigation of the 
penalty,' the Legislature indicated its intent tbat tbe judicial 
definition should continue as the law of this State. 
"After the enactment of section 190.1 of the Penal Code 
and its amendment in 1959 (Stats. 1959, Ch. 738) tbis Court 
in People v. Love, 53 Cal.2d 843, 856 [350 P.2d 705J, indi-
cated tbat the Friend decision still stated the permissible 
range on inquiry on the issue of penalty. 
"We respectfully suggest that the opinion of this Court in 
People v. Friend was correct, that it was adopted by the 
) 
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Legislature when it enacted section 190.1 of the Penal Code 
and should be the controlling law in this case. 
"This Court has repeatedly held that the jury could be 
informed of the minimum term a person given a life sentence 
for ·first degree murder must serve and the minimum average 
and maximum terms actually being served for first degree 
murder in California (People v. P1/,rvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884 
[346 P.2d 22] ; People v. Friend, 47 Ca1.2d 749, 755 [306 P.2d 
463] ; People v. Green, 47 Ca1.2d 209, 217 [302 P.2d 307]). 
The reason put forth by the court was that such matter is 
essential in ascertaining the significance of a life sentence 
and thus at arriving at an intelligent evaluation of the 
penalty to be imposed. 
"Certainly the same is equally true when dealing with 
deterrent effect of the penalties involved. 
"We respectfully suggest that the opinion of this Court 
in People v. Friend was correct, and that it is essential that 
the jury be advised of the deterrent effect of capital punish-
ment in order that they may intelligently and £'ffectively per-
form the grave responsibility given to them. 
"We are thus confronted with the question of whether or 
not capital punishment is a deterrent. 
"Logically it is indisputable that death is the greatest de-
terrent possible and as stated by Justice McComb it is a 
matter of common knowledge that th£' death penalty is a de-
terrent. 
"The use of the word 'lawfully' in our criminal statutes 
implies that the person knows what he is doing, intends to 
do what he is doing, and is a free agent (People v. Trombley, 
41 Cal.2d 801, 807 [sic, In re Trombley, 31 Cal.2d 801,807 
(193 P.2d 734)]). 
"This Court quite recently reaffirmed its belief in the 
dignity of man when in People v. Nash, 52 Ca1.2d 36 [338 P.2d 
416], at 50, it reiterated the basic premise of all moral and 
social order and the cornerstone of criminal law, that man is 
a creature possessed of free will, charged with personal re-
sponsibility for his choice of action. 
"Because man is a free agent and has a free will, it follows 
that his choice of aetion will be influenced by the consequences 
which will flow {rom it. Thus it follows that punishment for 
a crime will deter one from committing a crime. Thus at least 
one purpose of the penal law is to express a formal social con-
demnation of forbidden conduct, and buttress that condemna-
tion by sanctions calculated to prevent that which is for. 
) 
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bidden. The ultimate goal is deterrence (Sauer v. United 
States, 241 F.2d 640, 9th Cir., p. 648). 
"If there is any validity to the theory that the purpose of 
legally adjudicated punishment is to deter the commission of 
crime, it must follow that death, which is the 'King of 
. Terrors' (Job xviii, 14), which is the extreme penalty and 
. is so generally considered (People v. Gomez, 209 Cal. 296, 
300 [286 P. 998]), is the most effective deterrent. 
"Certainly no one can seriously argue that insofar as the 
particular individual involved, capital punishment is with-
out peer in its deterrent effect. 
"Insofar as its deterrent effect on others, the Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment in its report concluded that 
, Prima facie the penalty of death is likely to have a stronger 
effect as a deterrent to normal human beings than any other 
form of punishment, and there is some evidence (though no 
convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so' (pagc 
24). 
"Further proof of the effectiveness of the death penalty 
is to be found in answers to questionnaires circulated by the 
Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee on Capital Punish-
ment and found in its report pertaining to the problems of 
the death penalty and its administration in California. The 
overwhelming majority of judges, district attorneys and 
police officers were of the opinion that the death penalty 
should be retained. These are the men who are best qualified 
to arrive at such conclusion, for they are the individuals 
who are in direct contact with the criminal element in our 
society. 
"Probably one of the best statements of this is the follow-
ing remark of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen: 
"'No other punishment deters men so effectually from 
committing crimes as the punishment of death. This is one 
of those propositions which it is difficult to prove, simply 
because they are in themselves more obvious than any proof 
can make them. It is possible to display ingenuity in arguing 
against it, but that is all. The whole experience of mankind 
is in the other direction. The threat of instant death is the 
one to which resort has always been made when there was an 
absolute necessity for producing some result .... No one goes 
to certain inevitable death except by compulsion. Put the 
matter the other way. Was there ever yet a criminal who, ! 
when sentenced to death and brought out to die, would refuse I 
the offer of a commutation of his sentence for the severest : 
I 
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secondary punishment' Surely not. Why is this T It can 
only be becausc "All that a man has will he give for his life." 
In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; 
but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more 
forcibly.' (Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, 1949-
1953 Report, page 19.) 
"Indeed, as stated by Justice Schauer in his dissent, if 
capital punishment is not a more effective deterrent than im-
prisonment, it must be abolished. Actually it would have 
been abolished before now, for history clearly establishes the 
fact that disproportionate penalties shock human feelings and 
result in the equalization of crime and punishment. Thus 
over the years the death penalty has been limited to crimes of 
great atrocity and danger to society which cannot otherwise 
be effectually guarded against. 
"This principle has been recognized by our courts for it 
has been held that the Legislature may classify crimes and 
prescribe severer punishment for the commission of one class 
than for another as a deterrent against the commission of 
the more heinous crimes (People v. Smith, 218 Cal. 484, 489 
(24 P.2d 166J). 
"This certainly is reflected in the codes of the State of 
California wherein the Legislature imposes the death penalty 
only for the crimes of treason against the State (Pen. Code 
sec. 37), procuring the execution of an innocent person 
(Penal Code sec. 128), first degree murder (Penal Code secs. 
189 and 190), train wrecking (Penal Code sec. 219), kidnap-
ing with bodily harm (Penal Code sec. 209), and an aggra-
vated assault by a life prisoner (Penal Code sec. 4500). 
"Indeed, section 209 of the Penal Code is particularly 
demonstrative of the conclusion of the Legislature that the 
death penalty is by far a more effective deterrent than life 
imprisonment, for there when the person kidnaped suffers 
bodily harm, the punishment is to be life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole, or death, whereas in those in-
stances where the victim does not suffer bodily harm, the 
punishment is only imprisonment for life with the possihility 
of parole. This is proof that the Legislature recognizes that 
the death penalty is a more effective deterrent than mere life 
imprisonment. 
"Likewise, as pointed out in both of the dissents, the 
People of the State of California have constantly been called 
upon in recent years through the Legislature to abolish the 
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death penalty. In each instance the conclusion has been that 
the death penalty is a deterrent and it has been retained. 
"In the same vein, it is interesting to note that the People 
of the State of California have not been directly offered the 
opportunity to express their view in an election as to whether 
or not the death penalty should be abolished. 
"It seems only reasonable to conclude that if the proponents 
of abolition believed that the majority of the people of this 
State did not believe in capital punishment, that they would 
at least attempt to submit the matter to a popular vote. The 
failure to do 80 is the best proof that even the advocates of 
abolishment are convinced that the majority of the people 
of this State believe that it is an effective deterrent and desire 
its retention. 
"Historically it has been demonstrated that capital punish-
ment is a most effective deterrent. Little can be added to the 
excellent summaries of history to be found in the dissents 
filed in this case. They vividly pointed out that throughont 
the history of Christians and Jews, and more particularly 
throughout the history of California, the death penalty has 
been universally considered and has proven to be the most 
effective deterrent. 
"In addition to the effectiveness of the vigilantes referred 
to in the dissent of Justice McComb, we might add that 
similar activity in New Orleans in the 1890s resulted in an 
equally effective deterrent to crime. 
"The best summary of our argument is found in these 
words ... 'it is a matter of common knowledge that the 
death penalty is a deterrent.' 
"In reference to that portion of the district attorney's 
argument wherein he stated that it is a known recognized 
fact that criminals will carry toy guns or unloaded guns be-
cause of the death penalty, we respectfully submit that this 
is legitimate argument, for it is history and a matter of 
common knowledge. 
"In the dissent by Justice McComb numerous specific cases 
have been set forth which prove this argument is a correct 
reflection of history, as does the personal experience of Justice 
Schauer. 
" 
"In the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment Report 
it was stated: 'From them we received virtually unanimous 
evidence, in both England and Scotland, to the effect that I 
they were convinced of the uniquely deterrent value of capi-
) 
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tal punishment in its effect on professional criminals. On 
these the fear of the death penalty may not only have the 
direct effect of deterring them from using lethal violence to 
accomplish their purpose, or to avoid detection by silencing 
the victim of their crime, or to resist arrest. It may also 
have the indirect e1Iect of deterring them from carrying a 
weapon lest the temptation to use it in a tight corner should 
prove irresistible. These witnesses had no doubt that the 
existence of the death penalty was the main reason why lethal 
violence was not more often used and why criminals in this 
country do not usually carry firearms or other weapons. They 
thought that, if there were no capital punishment, criminals 
would take to using violence and carrying weapons; and the 
police, who are now unarmed, might be compelled to retaliate' 
(page 21). 
"Likewise, in the appendix to that report, page 335, specific 
instances were cited which confirm those set forth in Justices 
McComb's and Schauer's dissents. 
"In our own state a hearing was held before the Senate 
Committee on JUdiciary on March 9, 1960. That hearing was 
telecast in its entirety and was subsequently released as a 
printed report. 
"During that hearing a report from the Los Angeles Police 
Department entitled, 'Employees Report, Robbery Suspects 
in Committing Capital Offenses' was introduced. That re-
port showed that a number of defendants in conversations 
with reporting officers stated that they either had (1) toy 
guns, (2) empty guns, or (3) simulated guns, rather than 
taking a chance on getting the gas chamber. 
"Likewise the Sheriff of Los Angeles County, Mr. Pitchess, 
in his presentation referred t.o specific instances where sus-
pects had admitted that they had not armed themselves for 
fear of the death penalty. Likewise a tape was played to 
the committee in which a suspect had stated that a crime 
committed by him had been with a gun from which the firing 
pin had been removed so that no one would be injured, be-
cause he did not want to get the gas chamber (Report of the 
Senate Committee on Judiciary, March 9, 1960, pp. 149-153). 
"Likewise Mr. Coakley, the District Attorney of Alameda 
County, informed the committee that any chief of police 
or sheriff or district attorney in any large community has 
had the same experience of talking to robbers who had told 
them they used a gun which was inoperative because of fear 
) 
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of the death penalty (Report of the Senate Committee on 
Judiciary, March 9, 1960, p. 156). 
"Testimony to the same effect was elicited from Chief of 
Police Parker of Los Angeles (Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on Judiciary, March 9, 1960, p. 161). 
"In an article appearing in 35 State Bar of California 
Journal one of the outstanding defense attorneys of the State, 
Mr. Leo R. Friedman, stated: 
" 'The foregoing claims (that capital punishment was not 
a deterrent) cannot be reconciled with the numerous cases 
of robbery. bank stick-Ups, burglaries, etc., where the criminal 
used an unloaded gun or a toy pistol. Such criminals were 
willing to take a chance on being caught and imprisoned, 
but would not take a chance on killing the victim and being 
executed. 
" 'Naturally, there can be no statistics produced to demon-
strate how many murders were not committed because the 
would-be perpetrator feared the death penalty. If but one 
or two innocent lives are saved each year because the death 
penalty has deterred the commission of a murder, then the 
death penalty is justified. No one can successfully deny that 
the fear of the death penalty has saved innocent lives.' 
"The numerous specific instances are all part of the history 
of this State and they show that among the professional 
criminals capital punishment is a deterrent and because of it, 
he commits crimes armed with a toy or inoperative gun. Thus 
it was proper for the district attorney to so argue to the 
jury." 
For all the reasons stated in our dissents to the majority 
decision and for the further reasons so ably presented for 
the People by the Attorney General. the petition for rehearing 
should be granted. 
GIBSON, C. J., TRAYNOR, J., PETERS, J., WHITE, J., 
and DOOLING, J.-The dissenting opinion to the order deny-
ing rehearing requires this response. 
We held in this case that it was prejudicial error for the 
prosecutor in a murder case to assert that the death penalty 
is a more effective deterrent than life imprisonment when 
there was no evidence to that effect in the record and to bolster 
that assertion with statements of fact of which there was like-
wise no evidence in the record. 
The wisdom and deterrent effect of the death penalty are 
for the Legislature to determine, and are therefore not justici-
) 
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able issues. Hence our holding that evidence thereon was in-
admissible. Juries in capital cases are not legislatures ad hoc 
and trials on the issue of penalty are not to be converted into 
legislative hearings. Were it otherwise, counsel for both sides 
could prolong as well as confuse the trial on the issue of 
. penalty with a tangle of conflicting evidence on the vigorously 
. disputed proposition that the death penalty is a more effec-
tive deterrent than life imprisonment. Even the dissenters 
agree that "certainly the . . . holding is correct" that the 
"wisdom or deterrent effect of [the penalties of first degree 
murder] are for the IJegislature to determine and are there-
fore not justiciable issues. Hence evidence as to these matters 
is inadmissible. " 
The People argue that "it is proper to advise a jury of the 
effect of the various penalties between which they must 
choose, for only if such is done can the jury arrive at an 
intelligent determination of which penalty to impose." In 
support of this argument cases are cited holding that it is 
proper to inform the jury of the minimum term that a person 
given a life sentence for first degree murder may serve. 
What the petition for rehearing fails to recognize is that 
the basis of the argument permitted on the minimum term 
that may be served on a life sentence is the introduction of 
evidence to support such argument. Once we concluded that 
evidence of the comparative deterrent effect of the respectj'qe 
sentences was not admissible, it necessarily followed that argu-
ment on the subject would not be proper unless we could say 
as a matter of common knowledge that the death penalty is 
the more effective deterrent. We could not so conclude when 
it is common knowledge instead that there is vigorous dispute 
whether capital punishment is a more effective deterrent than 
life imprisonment. 
Thus "Whether or not the death penalty more effectively 
deters the crime of murder than would any other punishment 
is the most hotly debated question within the capital punish-
ment policy issue." (Ohio Legislative Service Commission, 
Capital Punishment, Staff Research R.eport No. 46, January, 
1961, p. 31.) This conclusion is documented in numerous 
studies by penologists, criminologists, legislative committees, 
and others. (See, for example, Report of the Royal Commis-
sion on Capital Punishment 1949-1953; Report of California 
Senate Committee on Judiciary :March 9, ] 960; .Assembly· 
Interim Committee Reports, 1955-1957, Report of Subcom-
mittee of the JUdiciary Committee 011 Capital Punishment 
I 
) 
) 
758 PEOPLE v. LoVE [56 C.2d 
Pertaining to the Problems of the Death Penalty and Its 
Administration in California; Thorsten Sellin, The Dcath 
Penalty-A Report for the Model Penal Project of the Ameri-
can Law Institute (1959); Sir Ernest Gowers (Chairman of 
the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment), A Life for a 
Life (1956); Bennett (Director of Bureau of Prisons, U.S. 
Department of Justice), Delaware Abolishes Capital Punish-
ment, 44 ABAJ 1053; Gardner (Chairman of the General 
Council of the Bar of England and Wales), Capital Punish-
ment in Britain, 45 ABAJ 259; Savitz, A Study in Capital 
Punishment, 49 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Police Science 338; George Ryley Scott, The History 0/ Capi-
tal Punishment (1951); E. Roy Calvert, Capital Punishment 
in the Twentieth Century (1927); Capital Punishment 
(1961), the National Council, Episcopal Church; Zilborg, The 
Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment (1954); 
Ball, The Deterrence Concept in Criminology and Law, 46 
J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 347, 353-354; The Deterrent Influence 
0/ the Death Penalty in Murder and tlte Penalty 0/ Death, 
284 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, p. 62; Morris, Thoughts on Capital Punish-
ment, 35 Wash. L. Rev. 335.) 
The Legislature has taken care not to express a preference 
for one penalty or the other. Instead it has left to the absolute 
discretion of the jury the fixing of the punishment for first 
degree murder. It bears noting that reasons other than deter-
rence have been advanced in support of the death penalty, 
such as retribution, and the protection of society from further 
harm from the defendant. It is a far-fetched speculation that 
the Legislature, by leaving it to the jury to impose one penalty 
or the other, has indicated that the death penalty is a more 
effective deterrent than life imprisonment. 
It is a baseless fear that the preclusion of arguments to 
the jury on a question they cannot properly evaluate without 
evidence will encourage murders in the commission of crimes 
of violence. The Penal Code provides for the death penalty. 
A criminal will hardly be emboldened to take a risk so grave 
because of a ruling that neither the defendant nor the prose-
cutor can introduce evidence or argue to the jury that one or ! 
the other of the penalties prescribed is the more effective 
deterrent. I I 
